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The paper focuses on the labor "hoarding" problem in Russian. We studied two forms
of "hoarding": unpaid leaves and short-time work. Our research is based on the Russian
Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) database. The paper exploits individual panel data
between 1994 and 1996.
We show that unpaid leaves and short-time work do not represent a form of hidden
unemployment. Both types of labor "hoarding" reflect the nature of employees' professional
competencies. First, unpaid leaves concern primarily the employees with firm-specific
knowledge, while short-time work affects strongly unskilled workers. Second, external
mobility is mostly related to young people and unskilled blue-collar workers while employees
with specific competencies do not change jobs so much.
The paper insists on significant internal adjustments which are taking place through
unpaid leaves and short-time work. This explains why there has been no massive
unemployment in Russia until now.
In conclusion, Russian labor market is characterized rather by internal flexibility than
by labor "hoarding".
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Introduction
One of the surprises of the Post-Soviet transformation is the relationship between
output and labor: in the context of dramatic output fall in 1991-1997 there was still no open
mass unemployment and no large decrease in employment1 in Russia. To explain this
puzzling result, different Russian and Western economists and sociologists draw our attention
to the enterprise level, pointing out, in particular, "labor surplus", or "labor hoarding" as
"guilty" practices which prevent reallocation and restructuring process in Post-Soviet
economy. Two forms of labor "retaining", i.e. "administrative" (forced unpaid or partially
paid) leave and short-time (reduced hours) work, are at the center of much of economic
studies.
Two main problems arise from this reasoning.
First, the labor hoarding hypothesis seems to contradict the evidence of the high labor
mobility in the enterprise data (Gimpelson et Lippoldt 1997) which is also stated in various
survey studies (Smirnov 1998). The intensive labor rotation, which in itself points at the
reallocation process, rejects the overhang idea: not only managers "hoard" labor by limiting
employment reductions, but they try to replace separated workers by "outsiders".
Second, and more generally, we do not know why Russian enterprises should hoard
labor.
Commander et al. (1995) insist on the social functions of the Russian firms: "And the
decision to enforce severance may further be complicated because in a large number of cases
firms are the source of a broad range of benefits and income supports for workers. Loss of
employment likely implies loss of access to such benefits, frequently with no clear alternative
suppliers" (p. 157-158). Layard and Richter (1994) evoke "paternalistic" behavior as one of
the reasons for the job keeping.
This argument does not seem to be satisfactory.
First, social support cannot be considered as a reason of labor retaining, since we still
do not understand the reasons of "paternalistic" commitment. Notice that the social support
argument was advanced from the viewpoint of employees, but not from the viewpoint of
firms. Why might managers keep social functions in the face of the drastic and continuous
shocks to output? In other terms, explaining the patterns of "abnormal" behavior by another
"abnormal" pattern which in turn has to be explained does not add a lot to our understanding. 
Second, since hiring rates remain rather high managers cannot be committed only to
"their" employees but to all workers they engage regularly from external labor market which
does not seem very realistic.
                                                          
1 Between 1994 and 1996, labor macro data shows a decline of employment by 1.9 millions (3.1 % of the total
employment), and similarly the unemployment (ILO definition) increased by about 1 million people (1.8 % of
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Notice, that the "technological" solution proposed by Commander et al. (1995) can
neither be considered as satisfactory: if technological rigidities restrain the amount of labor
adjustment, employee-retaining is no more justified by "overhang" or "hoarding" 2.
In this paper, we analyze two forms of labor "retaining": "administrative" leave and
reduced hours. Focusing our attention on these issues is justified by two main reasons.
First, both forms are often treated, though not empirically analyzed, as an evidence of
hidden unemployment. For instance, Commander et al. (1995) characterize Goskomstat
figures and the World Bank survey data on involuntary leave or short-time work as "a crude
measure of the current employment overhang": "we can see that releasing the marginally
employed into unemployment would have raised the unemployment rate by at least 300
percent" (p. 157). In the same vein, Standing (1994, 1996, 1998) who considers reduced
hours and unpaid leaves as hiding the "real" unemployment state, argues that employees put
on "administrative" leave have "minimal or no prospect of being recalled" (Standing 1994, p.
37)3.
Second, the choice of issues as unpaid leaves and short-time work is linked to the data
we have utilized.
The data source in this paper is a survey of individuals and households (Russia
Longitudinal Monitoring Survey, RLMS)4. We used and constructed variables on individuals
and households (see appendix 4 and 5 for the definitions and measurement of variables) and
enterprise characteristics, while focusing on the 1994-1996 sample in order to follow the
same individuals all over the period. We studied people between 15 and 72 years old, the
sample is composed 4607 persons.
One may say that the dataset which refers to individuals is not relevant to consider the
issues of labor hoarding as, contrary to firm surveys, it does not contain information on
enterprises.
We can counter-argue that the RLMS survey allows us to identify clearly a large set of
variables related to the individual behavior within the enterprise and reflecting the firm
policies towards their employees. This is, in particular, the case of unpaid leave and short-
time work5 that can be directly measured from the RLMS database. After all, we have no
evidence that information reported by employees on this issues is less valuable than data
given by managers in the firm surveys.
Moreover, data provided by individuals could be more precise in some cases. For
example, a lot of employment practices are not formally documented within a firm and/or
applied on the workshop or team level. Therefore, managers (and especially top-managers,
                                                          
2 See Fay and Medoff (1985) for the general argument and Clarke (1998) for the Russian case.
3 Linz (1988) suggests also that unpaid leaves could be considered as a "signal of management's commitment to
maintaining employment levels" (p. 15) without giving any explanation for the "job rights" keeping.
4 This survey stands as part of an international research project conducted jointly by the University of Chapel
Hill (USA), the Institute of Sociology, Russian Academy of Sciences and the Russian Institute of Nutrition.
5 We have measured short-time work as the time spent on primary work under 120 hours per month. As for
unpaid leave we used the results of explicit question on this subject.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 394
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i.e. those who respond usually to the firm survey) may count only "official" leaves or
working-hours' reductions, thus seriously underestimating the extent of a real labor
"retaining". As for an individual, he faces directly these practices, which allows measuring
them more accurately in the corresponding questions.
Finally, a firm survey usually do not contain any information on the individuals after
they quitted enterprise, it can only report data on hirings and separations. Thus, such issues as
unemployment or job-to-job movements, crucial for our paper are ignored. On the contrary,
the RLMS database allows us to highlight these issues, for it follows the same individuals
inside and outside the firms.
In fact, from 1994 to 1996 Russian labor market face a large reallocation of workers
through short-time work and unpaid leaves (see table 1). The survey data shows an important
reduction in working time. For instance the number of days –about 50 days– on unpaid leaves
correspond to a 20 % reduction in the total working days over a year6.
Table 1: Employment enterprise policies (in % of employed population)
% of people on
short-time work
% of people on
unpaid leaves this
year
Average number of days
on unpaid leaves*
1994 20.1 12.3 39
1995 18.9 6.6 58
1996 18.1 8.1 49
Sources: RLMS, rounds V, VI, VII
* On average per person on "Unpaid leaves".
The structure of this paper is as follows.
We start by testing the "hidden unemployment" hypothesis: do "administrative" leave
and short-time work represent preliminary states of unemployment? (Section I). We analyze
then the determinants of these two practices (Section II) and the relationship between job-to-
job mobility and labor-retaining (Section III). Finally we discuss our findings and propose
corresponding conclusions (Sections IV, V).
                                                          
6 The total of working days in 1996 was about 250.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 394
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I. Do "administrative" leave and reduced hours represent preliminary states of
unemployment?
There can be two-fold relationship between the forms of labor "hoarding" and unemployment.
First, if workers put on unpaid leave or short-time work have "minimal or no project
of being recalled", one should find a higher probability of becoming unemployed for these
workers. In order to measure unemployment, we choose the data on self-reported
unemployment. This definition is voluntary large in order into account all forms of
unemployment. We did not want to underestimate the unemployment phenomenon.
Second, the high risk of unemployment that both forms of labor "retaining" are supposed to
"hide" should be reflected in corresponding subjective perception of the current job position.
Such perception is an important characteristic of individual behavior with respect to
unemployment. For instance, people that have few job opportunities are obviously more
likely to accept various employment policies, in terms of work disciplining or labor
adjustment. We measure this "subjective" characteristic using the RLMS data which
contained two following questions7: "Are you afraid of losing your job?" and "How certain
are you that you will be able to find a work, no worse than your present job?"
We start by a general picture of the unemployment threat without any relation with the
problem of labor hoarding. Table 2 gives corresponding percentages – of subjective
perceptions and unemployment – for the total sample of individuals between 1994 and 1996
(on the basis of the RLMS data ). One may see that while the rate of unemployment (ILO
definition) is rather low, especially in 1994-1995, the "subjective" perception of
unemployment risk is high. People in general are very concerned about job losing and of not
finding another one. This result suggests that at least a large part of employees could be
subject to a permanent and strong pressure on behalf of managers who are able to impose
them different "precarious" employment practices.
Table 2: employment expectations of the employees (in % of employed people) and
unemployment (in % of the labor force, ILO definition)
% of people very
concerned about job
losing
% of people
absolutely uncertain
to find a new job
% of people
unemployed (ILO
definition)
1994 41.0 37.8 6.4
1995 39.9 37.2 6.1
1996 41.2 38.9 7.9
Sources: RLMS, Rounds V, VI, VII
We study now actual and perceived risks of unemployment in relation with unpaid leaves and
reduced hours. We examine the ordered probit (Greene, 1993, p.672-676) of "subjective"
variables and the simple probit (Greene, 1993, p. 643-655) for unemployment controlling for
all our individual, households and enterprise variables.
There are four main results emerging from regressions in Tables 3 and 4:
(i) Employees who had experience with unpaid leaves are more afraid of losing their
job and not to find a new job corresponding to their specialization, in case of eventual job
loss.
(ii) For the short-time experience, the "subjective" perception is quite on the opposite.
(iii) There is no evidence that inflows in unemployment in 1996 are related to having
been put on unpaid leaves in 1995.
                                                          
7 In the questionnaire, the evaluation of these “subjective” perceptions is marked from 1 to 5. In table 2, we
present only the worse perceptions i.e. when the variables are equal to 5.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 394
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(iv) By contrast, there is a strong positive relation between short-time-working in
1995 and becoming unemployed in 1996.
 Given these results, we can try to answer the main question of this section: can we
state that both forms of employment practices, i.e. "administrative" leave and short-time
work, represent preliminary states of unemployment? As for unpaid leaves, the answer is No:
even if unpaid-leave-workers feel more vulnerable regarding their job opportunities, there is
no proof that in reality these workers are facing higher risk of unemployment than other
groups of workers. As for the practice of reduced hours, contrary to "administrative" leaves,
the preliminary answer is Yes: short-time work may represent a preliminary stage of the
unemployment.
We will now shadow these conclusions since the results of the regressions in Tables 3
and 4 provide us one more important finding. Both forms of employment practices studied
here imply a kind of internal paradox. Workers who experience first form, unpaid leaves, are
rather afraid of losing their job, but in reality few of them are likely to become unemployed.
Workers who experience the second form, short-time work, are more likely to become
unemployed but they are far more optimistic regarding their future job opportunities.
  In the following considerations we try to propose a comprehensive understanding of
this double paradox.
(i) Consider workers who experienced unpaid leaves. Their fear of unemployment
provides a part of explanation why a large part of workers accept this "precarious" state of
employment. Unpaid leaves could be, therefore, used as a means of pressure by managers.
However, this instrument of disciplining is not likely to be utilized in actual managerial
strategies. Otherwise, the outflows from "administrative" leaves into unemployment would be
much more intensive. Hence, this form of employment policies, and only this form, i.e.
unpaid leaves, is consistent with the generalization made by Commander et al (1995) : "In
short, managers appear to have discretionary powers with respect to wages and employment,
but they evidently choose not to exert them to enforce large employment separations or
restructuring" (p. 178).
We suggest that the workers' "attachment" to the firm could be largely due to their
firm-specific skills. On one hand, those who accept unpaid or partially paid leaves are afraid
of not finding a workplace that conforms to their professional competencies outside the
borders of their "enterprise of origin"8. On the other hand, firms in general are neither
interested in releasing those employees whom they select for this practice and who accept it.
It seems that managers are not sure, that they could easily replace specialized workers
through the market, therefore, these workers are been kept within the firms. Thus, unpaid
leaves translate via the role of firm-specific skills the process of mutual "attachment" between
corresponding workers and enterprises.
We can, therefore, formulate the following hypothesis:
H1: the practice of putting employees on unpaid leaves is closely related to the firm-
specific skills of these workers.
(ii) Consider short-time workers now. If unemployment risk appear to be a real threat
for this group of workers in general, it is somewhat shadowed by the "subjective" perception
of this risk: short-time workers are not afraid of losing job or of not finding another job.
Notice, that in general, the determinants of "subjective" variables seem to correspond rather
accurately to the reality9. The relative "optimism" of short-time workers suggests that at least
a part of them may experience good opportunities on the labor market. This in itself does not
                                                          
8 This seems to be a more coherent explanation of why employees stay within firms than a "personal identity"
argument suggested by Layard and Richter (1994).
9 Thus, the perception concerning losing or finding a job is fare better for people involved in informal activities.
Is also better for male, for inhabitants urban settlements, and especially for the one from Moscow and really
worse for those with low level of expenditures per capita.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 394
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seem surprisingly given the above-mentioned high inter-firm mobility in Russia. As Clarke
(1998) pointed out, "the result of the very high rate of hiring is that redundancy and
unemployment are not the threat that they would otherwise be" (p 45). This seems to indicate
that short-time-workers behavior is strongly heterogeneous and that the heterogeneity is in
accordance with employment opportunities.
We can, therefore, propose a second hypothesis:
H2: Short-time workers differ by professional segments which translate different
outside job options.
In order to corroborate these hypotheses, we address two issues.
First, we need to study more deeply the characteristics of workers who were faced
with administrative leaves or short-time work. In Section II we examine the determinants of
both practices, controlling for professional qualifications which we consider as an indicator of
skill specificity.
Second, if unemployment risk differs by professional segments of employees, it is
necessary to analyze the likely relationship between job opportunities and labor segmentation.
Section III focuses on the characteristics of the job-to-job mobility with respect to unpaid
leaves and reduced hours. As before, the role of firm-specific skills is directly addressed.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 394
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Table 3: Probability to be certain of losing job or not to be able to find one
in 1995 (Ordered probit regression)
How concerned are you that
you might lose your job?
How certain are you that you
will be able to find work?
Variables in 1995 Coef. Standard
error Coef. Standard
error
Gender -0.265** 0.060 -0.522** 0.060
Age 0.002 0.002 0.012** 0.002
Education (year) -0.019 0.014 -0.015 0.014
Couple 0.037 0.063 0.013 0.064
Plots -0.039 0.058 0.108* 0.059
Informal Activity -0.205* 0.106 -0.260** 0.105
Manager -0.406** 0.133 -0.517** 0.138
Intelligentsia -0.260** 0.109 -0.471** 0.111
Engineer 0.016 0.134 -0.041 0.138
State servant -0.156 0.156 -0.302* 0.157
Trader-financier 0.068 0.135 -0.292* 0.137
Technician 0.063 0.106 -0.305** 0.107
Workman 0.020 0.095 -0.207* 0.097
Farmer 0.051 0.133 -0.107 0.137
Elementary job -0.066 0.108 -0.258** 0.109
In the forces -0.079 0.251 0.163 0.256
Driver -0.108 0.128 -0.155 0.130
Foreign -0.108 0.147 -0.240 0.149
Public -0.124* 0.070 -0.051 0.070
Private -0.162* 0.082 -0.102 0.083
# Workers<100 -0.062 0.073 -0.184** 0.074
# Workers>500 -0.003 0.071 -0.174** 0.072
Duration. arrears -0.006 0.010 0.023* 0.011
Am. Arrears -0.001 0.003 -0.003 0.003
Unpaid leaves 0.361** 0.104 0.367** 0.104
Short-time work -0.168** 0.063 -0.152** 0.064
In kind remuneration -0.041 0.090 0.082 0.091
# of child in the household. 0.033 0.028 -0.024 0.028
# of elderly in the household -0.016 0.044 0.044 0.044
Low hh. expenditure per capita 0.227** 0.055 0.241** 0.055
Medium hh. expenditure per capita -0.039 0.069 0.096 0.069
Moscow-St Petersburg -0.378** 0.116 -0.415** 0.118
Northwest -0.134 0.120 -0.111 0.122
Center -0.096 0.095 -0.043 0.096
Volga 0.082 0.095 -0.028 0.096
Caucasus -0.110 0.106 -0.220* 0.108
Urals -0.005 0.098 -0.061 0.099
Or. Siberia 0.255* 0.115 0.039 0.115
Semi-urban 0.458** 0.103 0.474** 0.102
Rural 0.214** 0.071 0.350** 0.072
µ (1) -1.430** 0.250 -1.452** 0.253
µ (2) -0.860** 0.249 -0.914** 0.251
µ (3) -0.583** 0.249 -0.515* 0.251
µ (4) 0.009 0.249 0.223 0.251
Log Likelihood -3151 -3059
Number of Observations 2190 2167
Chi² (39) 200.9 361.6
Prob. >chi2 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R² 0.03 0.056
Notes: Dependent variable Sources: Panel data from RLMS, Rounds V, VI, VII
y=1 if the person  is not concerned at all by losing job in 1995 y=1 if the person  is absolutely certain to find in 1995
y=2 if the person  is not very concerned by losing job in 1995 y=2 if the person  is fairly certain to find in 1995
y=3 if the person  is both yes and no y=3 if the person  is both yes and no to find in 1995
y=4 if the person  is a little concerned by losing job in 1995 y=4 if the person  is fairly  uncertain to find in 1995
y=5 if the person  is very concerned by losing job in 1995 y=5 if the person  is absolutely uncertain to find in 1995
Legend: *= statistically significant at the 5% level **= statistically significant at the 1% level
Reference variables: Clerk; Semi-public, # of employees between 100 and 500, High household expenditures per capita, Occidental Siberia and
UrbanWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 394
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Table 4: Probability to be unemployed (Self reported) in 1996 (probit regression)
Variables
in 1996/1995 Coef. Standard
error
Gender 0.133 0.138
Age -0.029** 0.006
Education (year) -0.079** 0.034
Couple 0.027 0.148
Plots -0.021 0.126
Informal Activity 0.765** 0.147
Manager in 95 0.416 0.310
Intelligentsia in 95 -0.810* 0.448
Engineer in 95 0.439 0.326
State servant in 95 -0.767 0.708
Trader-financier in 95 0.480* 0.271
Technician in 95 -0.010 0.268
Workman in 95 0.250 0.228
Farmer in 95 0.579* 0.270
Elementary job in 95 -0.089 0.263
In the forces in 95 0.529 0.490
Driver in 95 0.368 0.269
Foreign in 95 0.309 0.351
Public in 95 0.317* 0.180
Private in 95 0.511** 0.193
# Workers<100 in 95 0.099 0.177
# Workers>500 in 95 0.004 0.175
Duration. arrears in 95 0.018 0.018
Am. arrears in 95 0.009 0.005
Unpaid leaves in 95 -0.337 0.259
Short-time work in 95 0.413** 0.134
In kind remuneration -0.240 0.197
# of child in the household 0.036 0.060
# of elderly in the household. -0.057 0.099
Low hh expenditure per capita 0.263* 0.141
Medium hh expenditure per capita 0.166 0.163
Moscow-St Petersburg -0.269 0.312
Northwest -0.355 0.317
Center 0.215 0.214
Volga 0.005 0.216
Caucasus 0.270 0.230
Urals 0.095 0.222
Or. Siberia -0.019 0.253
Semi-urban -0.186 0.254
Rural 0.114 0.149
Constant -0.784 0.599
Log Likelihood -338.7
Number of Observations 2206
Chi²(39) 160.9
Prob. >chi2 0.0000
Pseudo R² 0.19
Notes:  Sources: Panel data from RLMS, Rounds V, VI, VII
Dependent variable: Legend:
y=1 if the person  is unemployed in 1996 (self reported) *= statistically significant at the 5% level
y=0 if not **= statistically significant at the 1% level
Reference variables: Clerk; Semi-public, # of employees between 100 and 500, High household expenditures per capita, Occidental
Siberia and Urban Settlement.   William Davidson Institute Working Paper 394
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II. Determinants of "administrative" leave and short-time work.
II.1. Detail analysis of the results.
We start this Section by analyzing the probability to be put on unpaid leaves and on
short-time work controlling for all individual, household and enterprise variables. For this
purpose we use simple probit model (Greene, 1993, p.646-655).
Table 5 provides regression results. First of all, we found out some common
determinants of both employment policies: the probability to be put on short-time work or
unpaid leaves is higher for female worker and for those involved in informal activities.
Other basic results are the following.
(i) Duration of wage arrears has a positive impact on the probability of being
concerned by the "administrative" leave during the current year and no impact on the
probability of being on short-time work.
(ii) Education influence is negative for "administrative" leave and has no impact on
short-time work.
(iii) Young age increases the probability to have a reduced-hours work and does not
play any role for the "administrative" leaves.
(iv) Particular professions increase or decrease both probabilities. For instance,
elementary job – without any qualification – and belonging to intelligentsia increase the
probability of short-time work while being a farmer plays in the opposite sense. Other
professions, workmen and engineers, increase the probability to be on "administrative"
leaves.
(v) Employment in small firms is negatively correlated with "administrative" leaves.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 394
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Table 5: Probability to be on Short-time work job or on Unpaid leaves
in 1996 (probit regression)
Short-time work Job Unpaid leaves
Variables
in 1996 Coef. Standard
error Coef. Standard
error
Gender -0.212** 0.085 -0.355** 0.105
Age -0.007* 0.003 0.001 0.004
Education (year) -0.011 0.020 -0.058* 0.026
Couple 0.036 0.088 0.120 0.113
Plots 0.187* 0.087 0.201* 0.103
Informal Activity 0.249* 0.138 0.205 0.161
Manager -0.382 0.336 -0.079 0.460
Intelligentsia 0.418** 0.150 -0.039 0.212
Engineer 0.100 0.200 0.840** 0.219
State servant 0.226 0.215 0.232 0.269
Trader-financier 0.116 0.177 -0.206 0.249
Technician 0.089 0.153 0.038 0.200
Workman 0.043 0.146 0.438** 0.177
Farmer -0.721** 0.275 -0.443 0.334
Elementary job 0.468** 0.156 -0.172 0.219
In the forces -0.448 0.504 0.237 0.520
Driver -0.218 0.244 0.094 0.276
Foreign -0.449* 0.259 -0.062 0.248
Public -0.005 0.112 -0.302** 0.119
Private 0.071 0.126 0.066 0.133
# Workers<100 0.036 0.104 -0.267* 0.134
# Workers>500 -0.013 0.104 0.042 0.121
Duration. arrears 0.018 0.013 0.040** 0.013
Am. arrears 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.003
In kind remuneration -0.092 0.123 -0.020 0.140
# of child in the household -0.064 0.044 -0.010 0.054
# of elderly in the household -0.036 0.066 0.075 0.078
Low hh expenditure per capita 0.041 0.087 0.282** 0.111
Medium hh expenditure per cap. 0.075 0.100 0.272* 0.126
Moscow-St Petersburg 0.143 0.165 0.296 0.210
Northwest 0.228 0.177 -0.575* 0.302
Center 0.101 0.145 -0.014 0.185
Volga -0.069 0.147 0.038 0.187
Caucasus -0.237 0.163 0.477** 0.193
Urals -0.006 0.147 0.163 0.183
Or. Siberia 0.169 0.170 0.053 0.229
Semi-urban 0.008 0.150 0.276 0.168
Rural -0.009 0.111 -0.272* 0.145
Constant -0.688* 0.366 -1.138** 0.466
Log Likelihood -842.9 -524.0
Number of Observations 1922 2205
Chi²(37) 95.5 148.7
Prob. >chi2 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R² 0.054 0.125
Sources: Panel data from RLMS, Rounds VII
Notes:
Dependent variable:
y=1 if the person  is on short-time work or unpaid leaves in 1996
y=0 if not
Legend: *= statistically significant at the 5% level
**= statistically significant at the 1% level
Reference variables: Clerk; Semi-public, # of employees between 100 and 500, High household expenditures per capita,
Occidental Siberia and Urban SettlementWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 394
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II.2. Preliminary conclusions.
(i) We can observe some distinct signs of the segmentation of employees. However,
this segmentation is not reduced to conventional division blue collars vs. white collars or low
skills vs. high skills. The probability of short-time work is important for elementary
professions, but for the intellectuals as well10. Both workmen and engineers are likely to be
concerned by the practice of unpaid leaves. In other words, if one considers both policies –
unpaid leaves and short-time work – as "precarious" states for the employees, there is no
evidence that the blue-collar workers are a particularly disgraced group.
Not only these findings corroborate heavily the hypothesis (H2) formulated in the
previous section but they even extend it: labor segmentation according to professional
qualification is not limited to the division within the pool of short-time workers but
characterizes those employees who faced unpaid leaves as well.
(ii) The relation between elementary qualification and short-time work suggests that
both forms of employment practices are rather different and even opposite regarding the
reasons of labor "retaining". Elementary workers are less qualified, most of them do not have
any specific skills while it is just the opposite for the basic characteristics of the employees
who had been put on "administrative" leave. The fact that the probability to be on unpaid
leaves is higher for engineers and workmen seems to be related to their specific competencies
within the firm, while short-time workers do not have any firm-attachment in terms of skills.
This confirms our first hypothesis (H1) related to the relationship between the forms
of labor "retaining" and the nature of employees' competencies.
(iii) Thus, the forms of labor "retaining" appear as forms of internal adjustment, which
affect differently workers according to their profession. If this is the case, labor demand of
Russian firms differs by professional competencies, which gives us a new argument to
suggest that the external the mobility of employees will probably be linked to their
profession.
We need now to investigate the mobility itself in order to find the impact of our two
proxies of labor "hoarding" on job-to-job mobility.
                                                          
10 However intellectual professions are usually working outside the enterprise, they are probably on short time
not because of the enterprise employment policy but rather because of their own activity, as teacher for
instance.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 394
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III. Labor "retaining" policies and job-to-job mobility.
III. 1. Three measures of external mobility
Until now, we have considered exits from enterprises as being mainly limited to
inflows in unemployment, which is only one component of external labor mobility. We shall
consider now another component of this mobility: movement across the jobs.
Measuring this component using the RLMS database is not evident. Thus, labor
turnover defined as hiring plus separations could not be calculated using households' or
individual data. Earle and Sabrianova (1999) argue that the RLMS data does not allow us to
estimate (external) labor mobility because of "ambiguity in the explicit question on job-
changing" (p. 11). In fact, with this question11 we actually could not distinguish individuals
staying within the enterprise from individuals moving outside.
Nevertheless, measuring external mobility on the basis of the RLMS survey is
possible by using three types of variables. We have searched to measure more precisely job to
job mobility. In our paper, it differs from the activity to activity mobility12; and is restricted
to primary wage-earning job.
First, we "filtered" the information provided by the "ambivalent" question mentioned
above with the data on professional mobility and we constructed on this basis a dummy
variable "New job". This approach appeared as justified, as we have found out in the
regression that "New job" depended positively on some variables that usually characterize the
labor turnover in Russia (see III.2).
Second, using the RLMS data we can define the date of entry in the firm as an
information of mobility. We constructed dummy variables "Change job" for people changing
firm between 1994 and 1995, between 1995 and 1996 as well as over the all period (1994-
1996)13. We checked that these people did really work the year before they changed job14.
Third, we defined another variable measuring the tenure of a person within a firm. We
constructed two dummies of less than one year of tenure and less than three years (see table
6). The interest of the "Tenure" variable is double. First, it allows measuring external
mobility. Second, as a measure of firm-specific competencies, it allows us to directly test the
stated above conclusions on the importance of the firm-specific skills.
The "New job" and the "Change job" dummies are explained by lagged independent
variables, while the "Tenure" dummies are explained by contemporary independent variables.
"Backward" and "forward" analysis could be conducted using these dummies in a simple
                                                          
11 The question is "tell me, please, did you change your place of work or profession by comparison with
December of last year?"
12 See B.Najman, A. Pailhé (2000) where the external labor mobility in Russia is defined as "activity to activity"
movement which includes formal employment, informal and individual activities, plots, and multi-activity.
13 Workers changing enterprise either in 1995 or in 1996.
14 We also checked that in every year chronology of entrance in the enterprise is coherent. For example in 1996
round the date of entry could not be reported before the date of entry reported in 1994 round.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 394
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probit model (Greene, 1993, p.646-655). All dummies reflect employees' behavior in relation
with their skills. The more workers stay within "their" firm the more they get firm-specific
competencies.
The following table (6) presents the extent of the job-to-job mobility (in terms of
percentage and number of people) according to RLMS data. We observe a high percentage of
people with low tenure (12-15 % with less than one year and 34-35% with less than three
years). This suggests a high job-to-job mobility. The variables "Change job" and "New job"
reflect somehow these results. We should stress that RLMS data probably largely
underestimate the labor mobility because in the panel data we are following people which are
not moving geographically.
Table 6: Job to Job Mobility in Russian Firms (in number of people and %)
YES Yes
(as a % of total) NO
Changed Job
Between 1994 and 1995 262 11.5% 2013
Changed Job
Between 1995 and 1996 284 12.3% 2014
Changed Job
Between 1994 and 199615 500 20.1% 1984
New job in 1996 342 12.9% 2315
Tenure less than 1 year in 1994 420 15.0% 2376
Tenure less than 3 years in 1994 981 35.1% 1884
Tenure less than 1 year in 1996 322 12.3% 2289
Tenure less than 3 years in 1996 883 33.8% 1536
Sources: RLMS, rounds V, VI, VII
III. 2. Results
The regression results are presented in Tables 8-11 and summarized in Table 7.
(i) The determinants of "New job" are closely related to the main characteristics of the
labor mobility rotation in Russia. For instance, it follows from the Goskomstat data and the
case studies (Gimpelson and Lippoldt 1997, Smirnov 1998) that young men with no
qualification are the bulk of Russian high mobility. It is the same for our study: having a new
job in 1996 is negatively correlated with age (young people have more chances), and
positively with one profession, elementary workers. Moreover, the "New job" movement is
                                                          
15 The person changed job either between 1994 and 1995 or between 1995 and 1996William Davidson Institute Working Paper 394
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linked to the other signs of extreme labor mobility in Russia, such as working in the small,
private or foreign firms and living in particular regions like Moscow and St-Petersburg.
Notice also the positive correlation of the "New job" variable with the substitution of
remuneration "in kind" (goods or services) for the pay in money16.
(ii) The key determinants of the "Change job" variable are close to those of "New
job", thus confirming most of characteristics of external mobility revealed by analyzing the
latter variable. The probability of moving across jobs is higher for young, male, and
elementary workers. In 1995-1996, changing job is highly probable for the inhabitants of
Moscow and St-Petersburg for employees in foreign firms and those accepting In kind
remuneration in lieu of wage pay.
(iii) Both variables of tenure in 1996, less than one year and less than three year, are
positively correlated with "traditional" determinants of mobility (being young, male, and
elementary worker) and being employed in private firm. Tenure is negatively correlated with
the amount of wage arrears and experience of unpaid leaves and positively to the
"demonetisations" of remuneration. Tenure of less than three years is negatively correlated
with intelligentsia, and positively with employment in a small or private firm. Tenure of less
than one year is positively correlated with living in Moscow-St Petersburg.
For 1994, the determinants of both tenure variables are largely similar. The main
differences are related to the appearance of negative correlation between being engineer and
having a tenure of less than three years.
                                                          
16 Russian firms generalize more and more the practice of offering goods or services instead of regular wage
pays. The RLMS survey contained an explicit question on this subject.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 394
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Table 7. The main determinants of the job-to-job mobility (see tables 8, 9, 10, and 11)
New job Change job
Short Tenure
(in 1994)
Short Tenure
(in 1996)
+young and male
+elementary job
+small firm
+private firm
+foreign firm
+In kind remuneration
+Moscow-St-Petersburg
+young and male
+elementary job
+foreign firm***
+In kind remuneration***
+Moscow-St-Petersburg***
+young and male
-unpaid leaves
+elementary job
-intelligentsia
3
-engineer
3
+small firm
3
+private firm
+public firm
-duration of arrears
1
+young and male
-unpaid leaves
+elementary job
-intelligentsia
3
-driver
+small firm
3
+private firm
3
-amount of arrears
+In kind remuneration
+Moscow-St-Petersburg
1
Here "+" and "-" indicate the sign of the correlation
1less than 1 year
3less than 3 years
***Only between 1995 and 1996
III.3. Conclusions.
(i) The positive relation between moving from job to job and elementary workers
provides an explanation to why at least one group of short-time workers is not afraid of losing
their workplace (see Section I). Being always prepared for job-changing, elementary workers
feel secure, since they do not actually face a direct threat of unemployment.
Notice that not all short-timers are prepared to quit the firm as elementary workers.
For instance, being female increases the probability of reduced-hours experience, but it is not
consistent with the status of a male worker mostly related to external mobility.
Thus, the hypothesis (H2) related to the segmentation of the short-time workers is
confirmed regarding outside job options.
(ii) If H1 is correct, that is if it is true that unpaid leaves are related to specific skills,
one should expect a positive correlation between unpaid leaves and longer tenure. Our
regression results show that this is actually the case for all four tenure variables (in 1994 and
in 1996).William Davidson Institute Working Paper 394
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(iii) In the same vein, professional structure of external mobility largely confirms this
relationship between the nature of employees' skills and the forms of labor "retaining". Our
findings show that quits are strongly related to the absence of firm-specific competencies
(elementary professions). On the contrary, despite the fact that we have already established
the link between staying within a firm and having specific skills (see previous point (ii) on
longer tenure and unpaid leaves), the negative correlation between some of the short-tenure
variables and employees with specific knowledge (engineers, drivers) still holds. The
Hypothesis 1 is again confirmed.
  (iv) The wage arrears appear to produce a coherent effect. The duration and the
amount of arrears are likely to increase the tenure. We propose a following explanation of this
result. Accepting wage arrears is primarily related to the limited job opportunities. Specific
skills could play an important role in employees' "tolerant" attitude. Thus, staying in firms
with wage debts or accepting to be put on unpaid leaves have the same reasons: this type of
employees wish to retain their jobs since they are not sure to utilize their knowledge
elsewhere. The positive correlation between the duration of arrears and probability of being
on unpaid leaves (see Table 5) seems to support this suggestion.
There is no evidence in the survey that social benefits play a substantial role in the
workers’ attachment to the firms with “wage problems”. On the other hand, “demonetisation”
of the employment relationship (goods and services instead of monetary wages) provokes
immediately separations that, therefore, seem to be voluntary quits.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 394
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Table 8: Probability to Have a New Job
in 1996 (probit regression)
New Job Variables in 1996 except
for labor "retaining" wage arrears
and In kind remuneration in 1995 Coef. Standard
error
Gender 0.270** 0.102
Age -0.015** 0.004
Education (year) 0.020 0.026
Couple -0.086 0.107
Plots -0.284** 0.110
Informal Activity 0.253 0.168
Manager -0.119 0.350
Intelligentsia 0.110 0.195
Engineer -0.252 0.280
State servant -0.010 0.288
Trader-financier 0.348* 0.215
Technician 0.099 0.194
Workman 0.166 0.180
Farmer -0.230 0.261
Elementary job 0.534** 0.192
In the forces -0.101 0.553
Driver 0.028 0.263
Foreign 0.416* 0.237
Public 0.002 0.130
Private 0.327* 0.145
# Workers<100 0.281* 0.129
# Workers>500 0.043 0.129
Duration. Arrears in 1995 0.005 0.019
Am. arrears in 1995 0.004 0.007
Unpaid leaves in 1995 -0.041 0.177
Short-time work in 1995 0.087 0.110
In kind remuneration in 1995 0.372** 0.144
# of child in the household -0.067 0.050
# of elderly in the household 0.000 0.077
Low hh expenditure per capita in 1995 0.194* 0.095
Medium hh expenditure per capita in 1995 -0.134 0.132
Moscow-St Petersburg 0.603** 0.198
Northwest 0.495** 0.204
Center 0.177 0.181
Volga 0.069 0.184
Caucasus -0.037 0.214
Urals 0.287 0.181
Or. Siberia 0.296 0.205
Semi-urban 0.011 0.183
Rural 0.075 0.130
Constant -1.597** 0.451
Log Likelihood -568.5
Number of Observations 1975
Chi²(39) 127.1
Prob. >chi2 0.0000
Pseudo R² 0.10
Notes: Dependent variable
y=1 if the person  has a new job in 1996 y=0  if the person had no new job in 1996
Legend:
*= statistically significant at the 5% level Sources: Panel data from RLMS, Rounds V, VI, VII
**= statistically significant at the 1% level
Reference variables: Clerk; Semi-public, # of employees between 100 and 500, High household expenditures per capita,
Occidental Siberia and Urban SettlementWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 394
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Table 9: Probability to Have Tenure Under 1 or 3 years in 1994 (probit regression)
Tenure Less Than
One Year
Tenure Less Than
Three Years
Variables
in 1994 Coef. Standard
error Coef. Standard
error
Gender 0.380** 0.090 0.500** 0.075
Age -0.027** 0.004 -0.031 0.003
Education (year) 0.002 0.022 0.020 0.018
Couple -0.059 0.096 -0.082 0.080
Plots 0.035 0.128 -0.165 0.103
Informal Activity -0.115 0.141 0.115 0.114
Manager 0.046 0.270 0.008 0.221
Intelligentsia -0.232 0.172 -0.284* 0.137
Engineer -0.103 0.214 -0.384* 0.171
State servant -0.251 0.237 0.044 0.187
Trader-financier 0.211 0.186 0.141 0.158
Technician 0.027 0.155 -0.091 0.126
Workman 0.051 0.149 -0.178 0.122
Farmer -0.046 0.210 -0.115 0.168
Elementary job 0.563** 0.163 0.592** 0.138
In the forces -0.821 0.542 -0.638* 0.377
Driver -0.237 0.213 -0.259 0.170
Foreign 0.257 0.234 0.269 0.192
Public 0.267* 0.113 0.174* 0.087
Private 0.450** 0.127 0.320** 0.101
# Workers<100 0.114 0.099 0.241** 0.082
# Workers>500 -0.127 0.102 -0.024 0.083
Duration. arrears -0.088** 0.030 -0.031* 0.019
Am. Arrears -0.003 0.011 -0.011 0.008
Unpaid leaves -0.804** 0.176 -0.549** 0.108
Short-time work -0.126 0.099 0.012 0.078
In kind remuneration 0.127 0.139 0.081 0.114
# of child in the household -0.021 0.042 -0.083** 0.035
# of elderly in the household -0.052 0.070 -0.047 0.057
Low hh. expenditure per capita 0.009 0.092 -0.153* 0.075
Medium hh. expenditure per capita 0.011 0.103 -0.063 0.084
Constant -0.170 0.369        0.607*          0.308
Log Likelihood -786.0 -1234.0
Number of Observations 2190 2190
Chi²(41) 217.6 351.9
Prob. >chi2 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R² 0.12 0.125
Notes:  Dependent variable: Sources: Panel data from RLMS, Rounds VI, VII
y=1 if the person had less than (1 or 3) year of tenure in 1994
y=0 if the person had more than (1 or 3) year of tenure in 1994
Regression is run with regional dummies and settlement type dummies.
Legend:
*= statistically significant at the 5% level
**= statistically significant at the 1% level
Reference variables: Clerk; Semi-public, # of employees between 100 and 500, Occidental Siberia and Urban
Settlement, high level of household expenditures per capita.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 394
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Table 10: Probability to Have Tenure Under 1 or 3 years in 1996 (probit regression)
Tenure Less Than
One Year
Tenure Less
Than
Three Years
Variables
in 1996 Coef. Standard
error Coef. Standard
error
Gender 0.255** 0.097 0.334** 0.078
Age -0.022** 0.004 -0.027** 0.003
Education (year) 0.001 0.024 0.014 0.019
Couple -0.173* 0.099 -0.149* 0.081
Plots -0.171 0.109 -0.144* 0.081
Informal Activity 0.391** 0.151 0.242* 0.131
Manager -0.213 0.325 -0.245 0.255
Intelligentsia -0.158 0.174 -0.294/ 0.141
Engineer -0.383 0.253 -0.134 0.180
State servant -0.401 0.277 0.020 0.195
Trader-financier 0.017 0.188 0.010 0.161
Technician -0.253 0.177 -0.125 0.139
Workman -0.187 0.160 -0.105 0.128
Farmer -0.193 0.237 -0.039 0.185
Elementary job 0.319* 0.169 0.527** 0.144
In the forces -0.359 0.570 -0.020 0.346
Driver -0.702** 0.291 -0.371* 0.203
Foreign 0.215 0.240 0.184 0.193
Public 0.080 0.136 0.022 0.100
Private 0.401** 0.147 0.387** 0.112
# Workers<100 0.011 0.125 0.147 0.095
# Workers>500 0.000 0.122 -0.024 0.094
Duration. Arrears 0.001 0.018 -0.020 0.014
Am. Arrears -0.017** 0.005 -0.008** 0.003
Unpaid leaves -0.408* 0.200 -0.356** 0.137
Short-time work 0.071 0.105 -0.030 0.086
In kind remuneration 0.346** 0.131 0.199* 0.107
# of child in the household 0.041 0.049 -0.047 0.039
# of elderly in the household 0.022 0.075 0.018 0.060
Low hh expenditure per capita 0.174* 0.102 0.002 0.079
Medium hh expenditure per capita 0.098 0.119 0.030 0.092
Semi-urban -0.116 0.196 -0.265* 0.144
Rural -0.053 0.134 -0.106 0.102
Constant -0.468 0.415 0.590* 0.334
Log Likelihood -616.7 -1067.0
Number of Observations 1886 1886
Chi²(41) 177.0 276.1
Prob. >chi2 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R² 0.126 0.11
Notes:  Dependent variable: Sources: Panel data from RLMS, Rounds V, VI, VII
y=1 if the person had less than (1 or 3) year of tenure in 1996
y=0 if the person had more than (1 or 3) year of tenure in 1996
Regression is run with regional dummies
Legend:
*= statistically significant at the 5% level
**= statistically significant at the 1% level
Reference variables: Clerk; Semi-public, # of employees between 100 and 500, Occidental Siberia and Urban
Settlement, high level of household expenditures per capitaWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 394
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Table 11: Probability to change enterprise, between 1994 and 1996 (probit regression)
Changed Job
Between 1994-1995
Changed Job
Between 1995-1996
Changed Job
Between 1994-1996
Variables
(are lagged, t-1)
Coef. Standard
error Coef. Standard
error Coef. Standard
error
Gender 0.227* 0.104 0.261** 0.101 0.300** 0.087
Age -0.020** 0.004 -0.011** 0.004 -0.019** 0.004
Education (year) 0.077** 0.027 0.022 0.026 0.050* 0.022
Couple -0.054 0.112 -0.185* 0.105 -0.148 0.094
Plots 0.045 0.151 -0.124 0.104 -0.071 0.128
Informal Activity 0.168 0.148 0.334* 0.155 0.239* 0.127
Manager -0.140 0.326 0.176 0.224 -0.254 0.279
Intelligentsia -0.240 0.198 0.061 0.193 -0.201 0.163
Engineer -0.048 0.232 -0.291 0.255 -0.128 0.195
State servant -0.280 0.277 -0.218 0.298 -0.325 0.229
Trader-financier -0.017 0.239 0.208 0.227 0.049 0.194
Technician -0.132 0.191 -0.004 0.188 -0.106 0.155
Workman 0.054 0.177 0.075 0.168 -0.001 0.145
Farmer 0.324 0.234 -0.158 0.243 0.101 0.198
Elementary job 0.359* 0.201 0.372* 0.184 0.369* 0.166
In the forces - - -0.283 0.527 -0.473 0.467
Driver 0.264 0.233 0.034 0.223 0.124 0.197
Foreign 0.218 0.253 0.419* 0.219 0.137 0.216
Public 0.121 0.122 -0.064 0.120 0.071 0.101
Private 0.242* 0.140 0.129 0.137 0.167 0.117
# Workers<100 0.010 0.113 0.208 0.128 0.145 0.097
# Workers>500 -0.169 0.114 -0.003 0.127 -0.056 0.098
Duration. arrears 0.025 0.026 0.023 0.015 0.028 0.022
Am. arrears -0.008 0.013 -0.001 0.007 -0.015  0.012
Unpaid leaves -0.023 0.136 0.109 0.158 0.021 0.112
Short-time work -0.036 0.109 0.151 0.105 -0.075 0.093
In kind remuneration 0.007 0.157 0.300* 0.138 -0.051 0.139
# of child in the household -0.016 0.050 0.013 0.048 0.015 0.042
# of elderly in the household 0.001 0.081 0.109 0.074 0.012 0.066
Low hh. expenditure per capita 0.088 0.106 0.076 0.094 0.060 0.089
Medium hh. expenditure per capita -0.040 0.122 -0.121 0.124 -0.024 0.101
Moscow-St Petersburg 0.066 0.195 0.467** 0.185 0.213 0.162
Northwest -0.250 0.208 0.257 0.196 -0.123 0.171
Center -0.002 0.156 0.020 0.167 -0.080 0.135
Volga -0.255 0.166 0.019 0.167 -0.168 0.139
Caucasus 0.026 0.176 -0.247 0.203 -0.115 0.152
Urals -0.300* 0.170 0.067 0.170 -0.291* 0.142
Or. Siberia 0.177 0.191 0.106 0.195 0.017 0.166
Semi-urban 0.082 0.158 -0.406* 0.205 -0.128 0.144
Rural -0.362** 0.140 -0.055 0.126 -0.204* 0.113
Constant -1.453** 0.439 -1.352** 0.432 -0.784* 0.368
Log Likelihood -574.2 -601.5 -854.0
Number of Observations 1825 1853 1902
Chi²(39) 83.6 102.5 107
Prob. >chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R² 0.068 0.078 0.059
Sources: Panel data from RLMS, Rounds V, VI, VII
Notes: Dependent variable
y=1 if the person changed enterprise during the period
y=0 if the person did not change enterprise during the period
Legend:
*= statistically significant at the 5% level  **= statistically significant at the 1% level
Reference variables: Clerk; Semi-public, # of employees between 100 and 500, Occidental Siberia and Urban
Settlement, high level of household expenditures per capita.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 394
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IV. Discussion.
We can conclude that labor "retaining" mechanism is not homogeneous. Firm's
behavior in this domain is linked to the labor segmentation. Each segment is composed by a
large group of employees whose characteristics determine the specificity of employment
policies. We can thus distinguish two major policies corresponding to different groups of
workers (see scheme 1).
(i) "Administrative"-leave-policies reflect firms' efforts to keep employees with
specific skills. Most of these workers have no choice since firm-specific competencies are not
likely to be employed elsewhere. "Administrative" leaves represent a form of internal
flexibility and they have only a secondary effect on external mobility: keeping firm-specific
workers favors pushing elementary workers outside the borders of the firm.
(ii) Short-time work reflects another form of internal flexibility, which is especially,
related to continuous, though not always regular demand for elementary professions.
Contrary to the employees endowed with specific competencies, most of elementary workers
are not integrated into the enterprise, they can easily quit it, thus playing an important role in
the connection between internal mobility (participating in the reduced hours practices) and
external mobility (job-to-job changing across the firms).
Finally, the role of wage arrears in the internal labor adjustment is similar to unpaid leaves
practices. Wage arrears for both amount and duration of arrears, are likely to be related to
long tenure. For employees who have few external opportunities and, therefore, are "locked"
within their firm there is practically no other solution than to accept wage arrears. In this case,
managers utilize wage arrears as an additional means of internal adjustment. The fact that the
probability to be on unpaid leaves is positively correlated with the duration of arrears
supports this interpretation. However, there could be also a problem of wage arrears
definition, since employees sent on "administrative" leaves often consider themselves as
suffering from wage debts even if formally firms do not owe them any wages.
These results are consistent with the evidence provided by much of case studies
(Koshman, 1995; Samara Research Group, 1996): enterprises continue to experience labor
shortages when they have to meet orders. Facing extreme uncertainty on the product market
managers' reaction consists in using various forms of internal flexibility. Therefore the
rational behavior is to create and keep a permanent reserve of human resources every time a
firm (or one of its departments or workshops) has to meet a sudden increase in demand.
The question is: in what kind of human resources are Russian enterprises interested?
The outlined results allow us to test the "technological" argument (Commander et al.
1995). This argument points out firm-specific nature of human resources and hence the
extremely complementary characteristics of labor-capital relation (Grosfeld et al., 1999). Our
results show that keeping firm-specific competencies as a part of the firms' strategies
represents a form of internal flexibility, i.e. labor adjustment, which explains relative
employment stability. The distinction between blue collar and white collar employees seems
to be undetermined in this context since the firm-specific competencies concern more
diversified groups of employees, including in particular engineers and most of workers.
  Nevertheless, the firm-specific explanation provides only a part, though important, of
understanding relative employment stability.
The results show also that the second form of labor adjustment is related to the
evident need to hire "labor in general". In other words, in the context of continuing
degradation of physical capital stock, labor tends to substitute capital which is necessary to
face the extreme product market uncertainty. This evidence is also in accordance with the
results of different case studies (Donova, 1996). Investment fall in Russian economy creates
permanent needs in unskilled workers (or former skilled employees who accept to work as
unskilled workers) which firms try to meet by the recourse to the internal mobility (reduced-
hours policy) or to the external labor market.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 394
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V. Conclusion
•   First, what is usually qualified, as labor hoarding seems to represent particular forms of
labor adjustment and internal flexibility. Two forms have been investigated in this paper:
unpaid leaves and short-time work work.
•   Second, unpaid leaves and short-time work correspond to different segments of labor.
However, this segmentation is not reduced to a simplified opposition blue collar versus
white collar.
•   Third, at least these two forms of labor adjustment provide us a robust explanation of
labor-output Russian paradox. Both of them stimulate internal labor reallocation.Scheme 1: Internal Flexibility and External Mobility
Short-time work
Elementary professions
"Mobile"
Unpaid leaves
Engineers
Workmen
"No exit"
Exit
Elementary
Professions
Enterprise A
Unemployment
Enterprise B
Professional MobilityWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 394
REFERENCES
Clarke S. (1998), "Structural adjustment without mass unemployment? Lessons from
Russia", in S. Clarke (ed.), Structural adjustment without mass unemployment? Lessons from
Russia, Edward Elgar, Cheltanham, pp. 9-86.
Commander S., J. McHale and R. Yemtsov (1995), "Russia", in S. Commander and F.
Coricelli (eds.), Unemployment, restructuring and the labor market in Eastern Europe and
Russia, Washington, D.C., The World Bank, pp. 147-191.
Donova I. (1996), "A Miner's Town: From the Problem of Employment to the Problem
of Personnel Management", in Clarke S. (ed.), Labor Relations in Transition: Wages,
employment and industrial conflict in Russia, Edward Elgar, Cheltanham, pp. 160-176.
Earle J.S. and K.Z. Sabrianova (1999), "Understanding wage arrears in Russia", - SITE
Working Paper n. 139, Stockholm, January, 56 p.
Fay J.A. and J.L. Medoff (1985), "Labor and Output Over the Business Cycle: Some
Direct Evidence", - American Economic Review, vol. 75, n.4 (September) pp. 638-655.
Gimpelson V. and D. Lippoldt (1997), "Labor Turnover in the Russian Economy", in
Labor Market Dynamics in the Russian Federation, OECD Proceedings, Paris, pp. 17-56.
Gimpelson V. and D. Lippoldt (1999), Labor Turnover in Russia: Evidence from the
Administrative Reporting of Enterprises in Four Regions, Transition Economic Series, n. 4,
IHS, Vienne.
Greene, W. H. (1993), Econometric Analysis, Macmillan, second edition, New York.
Grosfeld I, Senik-Leygonie C., Verdier T., Kolenikov S., Paltseva E., (1999),
"Dynamism and Inertia on the Russian Labor Market. A Segmentation Model", Delta working
paper, n°1999-03, Paris.
Kabalina V.I., I.M. Kozina and I.V. Donova (1996), "Restrukturirovaniye zaniatosti na
predpriyatiyakh i razvitiye rynka trouda v Rossii", - Obchestvo i ekonomika, n. 9-10, pp. 112-
142.
Koshman M.V. (1995), "Zavod spetsialnogo oborudovania", - In: Gertchikov V.I. et
Kochman M.V. (éds.), Sobstvennost' i trudovye otnochenia : varianty transformatsii. Sbornik
keisov, IEiOPP, Novosibirsk, pp. 71-104.
Layard R. and A. Richter (1995), "How much unemployment is needed for
restructuring: the Russian experience", - Economics of transition, vol. 3, n. 1, pp. 39-58.
Linz S.J. (1998), "Job Rights in Russian Firms: Endangered or Extinct Institution?" -
Comparative Economic Studies, n. 4 (Winter), pp. 1-32.
Najman B. and A. Pailhé (2000), External Labor Mobility in Russia: from Jobs to Plots,
paper presented at the 48th. IAES Conference in Montreal, June, 48 p.
Russian Economic Trends (1999), various issues.
Samara Research Group (1996), "Two military-industrial giants", - In: Clarke S. (ed.),
The Russian enterprise in transition. Case Studies, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, Brookfield, pp.
248-332.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 394
Smirnov P. (1998), "The economic development of industrial enterprises and the
dynamics and structure of employment", in  S. Clarke (ed.), Structural Adjustment without Mass
Unemployment? Lessons from Russia, Edward Elgar, Cheltanham, pp. 186-199.
Standing G. (1994), "Why Measured Unemployment in Russia Is So Low: The Net With
Many Holes", - Journal of European Social Policy, 4 (1), pp. 35-49.
Standing G. (1996), "Reviving Lost Souls: Russian Enterprise Restructuring", ILO,
Geneva
Standing G. (1998), "Reviving Lost Souls: Russian Enterprise Restructuring", in S.
Clarke (ed.), Structural adjustment without mass unemployment? Lessons from Russia, Edward
Elgar, Cheltanham, pp. 147-185.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 394
Appendix
APPENDIX 1: Job Tenure average by professions in 1996
Tenure less than 1
year
(In % of the total)
Tenure less than 3
years
(In % of the total)
Tenure
N
With
Tenure
Average
years
Standard
error
Total 24 % 41% 8.7 9.3 2711
engineer 18% 31% 12.0 10.6 130
intelligentsia 21% 34% 10.4 10.1 372
workman 23% 39% 9.8 10.0 742
farmer 23% 41% 9.7 10.1 198
technician 19% 37% 9.3 9.2 292
driver 19% 32% 8.8 8.3 125
clerk 26% 40% 8.1 8.6 242
manager 24% 51% 7.0 8.9 46
state servant 21% 48% 6.6 7.1 100
in the forces 12 % 40 % 5.8 4.2 26
trader-financier 34% 56% 5.3 6.5 170
elementary job 40% 60 % 4.6 5.9 268
Sources: RLMS, round VIIWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 394
APPENDIX 2: Tenure within individual and household characteristics in 1996
Tenure less than 1
year
(In % of the total)
Tenure less than 3
years
(In % of the total)
Tenure
N
With
Tenure
Average
years
Standard
error
Gender
Male 26% 45% 8.5 9.5 1209
Female 23% 38% 8.9 9.1 1404
Age
Less than 25 56% 80% 1.9 2.3 207
25-40 26% 44% 5.9 5.4 1075
40-55/60 19% 33% 11.5 10.2 1093
Over 55/60 16% 29% 15.0 13.6 238
Education
Primary 17% 34% 11.1 11.1 102
Secondary 25% 43% 8.5 9.1 1261
University 24% 40% 8.8 9.3 1250
20% 37% 9.0 9.4 616
17% 36% 8.5 8.8 179
27% 43% 8.8 9.3 1818
23% 42% 8.8 9.4 781
26% 44% 8.9 9.8 539
24% 40% 8.6 9.1 1293
Type of Settlement
Rural
Semi-urban
Urban
Household Expenditures1
High
Medium
Low
Work on Plots
No 27% 45% 7.9 8.6 1851
Yes 18% 33% 10.7 10.5 762
Informal Activities
No 24% 41% 8.7 9.3 2447
Yes 30% 43% 8.2 9.2 166
Sources: RLMS, round VII
                                                          
1 The households expenditures are per capita, and adjusted by the oxford scale (here 0.5 for child, and 0.75 for
elderly people)William Davidson Institute Working Paper 394
APPENDIX 3: Tenure within enterprise characteristics and employment policy in 1996
Tenure less than 1
year
(In % of the total)
Tenure less than 3
years
(In % of the total)
Tenure
N
With
Tenure
Average
years
Standard
error
Firm size
<20 30% 50% 7.2 8.8 341
21-100 26% 41% 8.4 8.9 594
100-200 17% 31% 10.1 9.6 211
201-500 24% 43% 9 9.5 236
Over 500 13% 26% 12.1 10.1 341
Ownership
State 22% 39% 8.9 9.3 1580
Semi-public or Partnership 19% 37% 10.1 9.8 458
Private 32% 48% 7.6 9.0 557
On Short-time work
No 23% 40% 8.7 9.2 2207
Yes 30% 44% 8.7 9.7 406
25% 43% 8.5 9.2 2373
16% 27% 11.8 10.2 215
On unpaid leaves
No
Yes
Sources: RLMS, round VIIWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 394
APPENDIX 4: Definition of variables
Variable Definition
Gender Equals 1 if the person is a man, else 0
Age Age of the person
Education Education number of years
Couple Equals 1 if the person lives as a couple, else 0
Plots Equals 1 if the person worked on a plots, else 0
Informal Activity Equals 1 if the person worked in an Informal Activity, else 0
Unemployment self-rep. Equals 1 if the person reported it self as unemployed , else 0
Tenure Number of years of tenure
Tenure less then 1 year Equals 1 if the tenure of the person is 1 year or less, else 0
Tenure less than 3 years Equals 1 if the tenure of the person is 3 year or less, else 0
Change job Equals 1 if the person changed job during the period, else 0
# children Number of children in the family (respondent excluded)
# elderly Number of elderly in the family (respondent excluded)
Low hh expenditure 94 Equals 1 if the person bellows to low per capita expenditure (real) category in 1994, else 0
Medium expenditure 94 Equals 1 if the person bellows to medium per capita expenditure (real) category in 1994, else 0
Low expenditure 95 Equals 1 if the person bellows to low per capita expenditure (real) category in 1995, else 0
Medium expenditure 95 Equals 1 if the person bellows to medium per capita expenditure (real) category in 1995, else 0
Center Equals 1 if the person lives in Central Russia, else 0
Northwest Equals 1 if the person lives in Northwest Russia, else 0
Volga Equals 1 if the person lives in Volga, else 0
Caucasus Equals 1 if the person lives in Caucasus, else 0
Urals Equals 1 if the person lives in Urals, else 0
Occ. Siberia Equals 1 if the person lives in Occidental Siberia, else 0
Or. Siberia Equals 1 if the person lives in Oriental Siberia, else 0
Manager Equals 1 if the person is a manager, else 0
Intelligentsia Equals 1 if the person belongs to intelligentsia, else 0
Engineer Equals 1 if the person is an engineer, else 0
State servant Equals 1 if the person is a state servant, else 0
Trader-financier Equals 1 if the person works in trade or finance, else 0
Technician Equals 1 if the person is a technician, else 0
Clerk Equals 1 if the person is a clerk, else 0
Workman Equals 1 if the person is a workman, else 0
Farmer Equals 1 if the person is a farmer, else 0
Elementary job Equals 1 if the person has an elementary job, else 0
In the forces Equals 1 if the person is in the army, else 0
Driver Equals 1 if the person is a driver, else 0
# workers<100 Equals 1 if the person works in an enterprise of less than 100 employees, else 0
# workers>500 Equals 1 if the person works in an enterprise of more than 500 employees, else 0
Private Equals 1 if the person works in a private establishment, else 0
Public Equals 1 if the person works in a state-run establishment, else 0
Foreign Equals 1 if the person works in a firm with foreign share, else 0
Newjob 96 Equals 1 if the person found a new job since December 1995, else 0
Short-time work 94 Equals 1 if the person works 120 hours by month and less in 1994, else 0
Short-time work 95 Equals 1 if the person works 120 hours by month and less in 1995, else 0
Short-time work 96 Equals 1 if the person works 120 hours by month and less in 1996, else 0
Unpaid leaves 94 Equals 1 if the person has been sent on compulsory unpaid leaves in 1994
Unpaid leaves 95 Equals 1 if the person has been sent on compulsory unpaid leaves in 1995
Unpaid leaves 96 Equals 1 if the person has been sent on compulsory unpaid leaves in 1996
Am. arrears 94 Total amount of money not been paid to worker in 1994 (*100000)
Am. arrears 95 Total amount of money not been paid to worker in 1995 (*100000)
Duration arrears 94 Wage arrears duration in months in 1994
Duration arrears 95 Wage arrears duration in months in 1995
In kind remuneration 96 Equals 1 if the person has been paid in goods or services in 1996, else 0
Sources: RLMS, rounds V, VI, VIWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 394
APPENDIX 5: Number of observations, mean, standard deviation, minimum and
maximum of all variables in 1996, 1995 and 1994
Variable Nb. of Obs. Mean Stand. Dev. Min Max
Gender 4607 0.43 0.50 0 1
Age in 1996 4607 44.67 15.46 16 72
Education in 1996 4607 10.94 2.76 0 15
Couple in 1996 4607 0.70 0.46 0 1
Plots in 1996 4607 0.34 0.47 0 1
Informal Activity in 1996 4607 0.07 0.25 0 1
Unemployment self reported 96 4607 0.08 0.27 0 1
Tenure less then 1 year in 1996 2611 0.12 0.33 0 1
Tenure less than 3 years in 1996 2611 0.34 0.47 0 1
Tenure in 1996 2611 9.67 9.20 1 55
Tenure in 1995 2747 9.57 9.21 1 54
Change job between 96 & 95 2298 0.12 0.33 0 1
Change job between 95 & 94 2275 0.12 0.32 0 1
Change job in 1996 or 1995 2484 0.20 0.40 0 1
Urban 4607 0.65 0.48 0 1
semi-urban 4607 0.06 0.24 0 1
Rural 4607 0.28 0.45 0 1
# Children 4607 0.84 0.98 0 8
# Elderly 4607 0.38 0.59 0 3
Low expenditure 96 4605 0.56 0.50 0 1
Medium expenditure 96 4605 0.18 0.39 0 1
High expenditure 96 4605 0.26 0.44 0 1
Center 4607 0.21 0.40 0 1
Volga 4607 0.19 0.40 0 1
Caucasus 4607 0.13 0.34 0 1
Urals 4607 0.16 0.36 0 1
Or. Siberia 4607 0.09 0.28 0 1
Occ. Siberia 4607 0.10 0.30 0 1
Northwest 4607 0.06 0.24 0 1
Moscow-St Pe 4607 0.06 0.24 0 1
Manager 4607 0.01 0.10 0 1
Intelligentsia 4607 0.08 0.27 0 1
Engineer 4607 0.03 0.17 0 1
State servant 4607 0.02 0.14 0 1
Clerk 4607 0.05 0.22 0 1
Workman 4607 0.04 0.19 0 1
Trader-financier 4607 0.06 0.24 0 1
Technician 4607 0.16 0.37 0 1
Farmer 4607 0.04 0.20 0 1
In the forces 4607 0.06 0.23 0 1
Driver 4607 0.01 0.07 0 1
Elementary job 4607 0.03 0.16 0 1
# workers<100 2668 0.38 0.48 0 1
# workers>500 2668 0.47 0.50 0 1
Private in 1996 2668 0.20 0.40 0 1
Foreign in 1996 2668 0.03 0.17 0 1
Public in 1996 2668 0.60 0.49 0 1
Am. arrears 96/100000 2287 8.87 15.12 0 240
Duration. arrears 96 2501 2.32 3.81 0 36
Short-time work 94 2782 0.12 0.33 0 1
Short-time work 95 2769 0.07 0.25 0 1
Short-time work 96 2643 0.08 0.27 0 1
Unpaid leaves 94 2461 0.20 0.40 0 1
Unpaid leaves 95 2425 0.19 0.39 0 1
Unpaid leaves 96 2283 0.18 0.39 0 1
In kind remuneration in 94 2781 0.09 0.29 0 1
In kind remuneration in 95 2764 0.09 0.28 0 1
In kind remuneration in 96 2641 0.13 0.33 0 1
Sources: RLMS, rounds V, VI, VIIDAVIDSON INSTITUTE WORKING PAPER SERIES - Most Recent Papers
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